Iijima -- Con Law Liberties
PRACTICE EXAMINATION - 1997
Mr. Jones is suing the police officers, the City, and the State in federal district court pursuant to
the ISA, a federal statute. Accordingly, the powers of the state government, as well as the powers
of federal courts and Congress are in question.(1)
Power of State to Regulate Police(2)
The state clearly has power to regulate the activities and policies of state and local police. Because regulation of police activities is not among the enumerated powers of Congress, such power is reserved to the states under the 10th amendment. Issues of health, safety, and public welfare, are generally within a state's police powers. Investigatory stops are associated with public health, welfare, and safety.
[We'll deal with issues of preemption/supremacy clause later in the course.]
Congress' Power to Regulate Police
Because the facts state that the ISA is a federal statute, the question arises whether Congress had the power to enact the ISA. If the ISA was outside Congress' power, Mr. Jones will not be able to prevail pursuant to the ISA's provisions.
Congress' power to act is limited to its enumerated powers and other actions reasonably necessary to achieve those enumerated powers. The ISA does not specify, however, the source of Congress' power to enact the statute. The Constitution does not specifically give Congress the power to act regarding police and safety issues. Rather, those are issues traditionally left to state (and local) regulation. These fall under the State's reserved powers. Mr. Jones would have to argue that the ISA is an appropriate means to achieve one of its enumerated powers.
Article I, § 8, cl. 3 gives Congress the power "to regulate Commerce ... among the several States." This clause gives Congress plenary power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. It also gives Congress the power to regulate matters having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Here is it arguable that the ISA is regulating the instrumentalities or channels of interstate commerce. Mr. Jones was stopped while driving a car (instrumentality) on a road (channel). The ISA, however, apparently is broadly drafted to include any "stop" by police officers, whether or not the individual stopped was driving a car. Although it could go either way, I think that the court would find that the ISA is not regulating either channels or instrumentalities.(3) It does not regulate generally about the conditions of using either channels or instrumentalities, but focuses on a very specific activity which might or might not involve driving on roadways.
It is also unclear whether or not the ISA is within Congress' powers under the "affecting interstate commerce" classification described by the Court in Lujan. An act discriminating against African-American probably does affect interstate commerce, particularly because even trivial effects may be counted together to produce a substantial effect. See Heart of Atlanta Motel; Katzenbach v. McClung. Mr. Jones would argue that if police discriminatorily stop African-Americans, they will be less likely to travel, and less likely to participate in commercial activities. Despite this effect, however, the Court might find the ISA beyond Congress' Commerce Clause powers. In Lopez, a majority of the Court held that the activity regulate should be commercial in nature. Investigatory stops are not commercial in nature, although they may have commercial repercussions. Although Justices Kennedy & O'Connor would not automatically strike down the ISA because of its non-commercial nature, they, along with the remaining 3 justices in the majority are skeptical of Congress' attempts to regulate in areas of traditional state activity. Here, police activities are within the State's traditional areas. Kennedy & O'Connor may, however, be reluctantly willing to uphold a statute, if convinced that the statute nevertheless is connected with interstate commerce. For example, Congressional findings relating discriminatory investigatory stops with substantial effects on interstate commerce might help convince them. Also, a jurisdictional statement limiting the reach of the ISA to channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or to matters substantially affecting interstate commerce might help convince them of Congress' powers. For example, the statute might state that "any investigatory stops by police officers of instrumentalities of interstate commerce are subject to this Act." If Kennedy and O'Connor are convinced that the ISA does, indeed, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, they might join the 4 dissenting justices in Lopez in upholding the ISA.
The Lopez dissent would apply the traditional rational basis test, and uphold the ISA if it is
reasonably related to a legitimate Congressional interest. This test is liberally construed and
Congress is given a great deal of deference. Accordingly, for purposes of the "ends" prong of the
rational basis test, the Lopez dissenters probably would assume that Congress enacted the ISA in
furtherance of one of its enumerated powers. Even if the ISA did not explicitly reference a
specific enumerated power, the dissenters probably would try to find an enumerated power that
might be served by the ISA. They would probably assume Congress meant to act under its
Commerce Clause powers. Furthermore, the dissenters would defer to Congress in applying the
"means" prong of the rational basis test: they would assume the ISA would be rationally related to
protecting interstate commerce, using arguments from Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach.
Power of Federal Courts to Hear Jones' Case
Mr. Jones intends to bring his lawsuit in federal district court. Accordingly, an issue regarding the jurisdiction of the federal courts arises. According to Art. III, § 2, federal courts have federal question jurisdiction, that is, power to hear cases arising under the U.S. Constitution and federal laws.(4) Here, Mr. Jones may raise a number of federal issues: enforcement of ISA, a federal statute, as well as possible constitutional violations, including 4th Amendment search & seizure, 14th Amendment Due Process, and 14th Amendment Equal Protection.(5)
Standing: injury-in-fact: Mr. Jones' suit would raise standing issues. First, he would have to be able to show an injury-in-fact. He might have suffered such injury when he was stopped by the police officers. First, an unjustified stop may have caused embarrassment or damage to his reputation. An injury-in-fact need not be tangible. Second, Jones may be able to argue that the stop violated the ISA: Central City presumably had not adopted the ISA procedures; he is African-American, a "member of a minority race;" and he was subjected to an "investigatory stop by a police officer" (Cagney & Lacey). Third, he may be able to argue a violation of his constitutional rights. He would have a harder time showing an injury-in-fact for purposes of obtaining injunctive relief. Because an injunction focuses on the future, he would have a difficult time showing an actual injury. See Lyons. Like Lyons, he would have to show a probability that he would be subjected to unjustified stops in the future. This showing would be extremely difficult unless he could establish that Central City had a policy of stopping minorities without justification. Jones might argue that the ISA gives him standing in regard to injunctive relief, because it states that members of minority races "may proceed . . . to recover injunctive relief." The City, however, would cite to Lujan for the proposition that Congress cannot legislatively create an injury-in-fact, but only may recognize actual injuries.
Standing: causation: Standing also requires Jones to prove that the stop caused any injuries. The unjustified stop is directly linked to the embarrassment, damage to his reputation, and violations of constitutional and statutory rights. On the other hand, trying to prove a link between future actions and future injuries is somewhat problematic.
Finally, the standing doctrine requires Jones to show that the remedy he requests would redress the injuries suffered. His damages claim is typical, in that it asks for money to compensate him for injuries suffered.(6) His claim for injunctive relief raises redressability issues. How can you remedy injuries that have not yet occurred?
Similarly, while Jones' claim for damages is ripe, his claim for injunctive relief may not be ripe.
1. These 2 sentences may be a waste of time, depending upon the person grading your exam. It gives some guidance regarding the organization of the answer, which may help you or may help the grader. Because I give points for identification of issues, rules, and facts, but do not give points for material previously discussed, introductions, summaries, etc., generally are a waste of time. Each semester, a number of students will spend up to 5 pages "warming up" with summaries, discussions of the general area of law, etc. I would advise you to warm up by outlining major points on another sheet of paper, then diving into the analysis in the blue books.
2. Headings may help you organize your answer, and may help me understand your analysis.
3. Reach a conclusion based on your analysis of the law & facts. Although it is not important for your conclusion to be the one I would reach, your analysis should support your conclusion.
4. I did not bother listing all the other types of cases that federal courts have power to hear, because the others are not relevant to this situation.
5. As I discussed in class, the constitutional liberties issues are not necessary for purposes of this question. Most of you won't be seeing these issues until next semester. Because I generally don't give points for issues not specifically addressed in Powers, I would advise against going into any detail on the due process & equal protection issues (unless addressed in our Powers materials or class discussion).
6. Our system has adopted the theory that $ can remedy non-pecuniary injuries.